2016年2月2日 星期二
2015.12 Asia Asset Management - CalPERS finally discloses profits and fees on its PE investments
By Paul Mackintosh-Monday, November 30,
2015
I make no apology for revisiting the saga of the California | Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) and its private equity (PE) commitments. After all, everybody else is. Because the pension giant and iconic PE limited partner (LP) has finally disclosed the profits – and fees – on its PE investments. And there couldn't be a more urgent topic for the entire asset class. The Los Angeles Times's headline sums it up succinctly: "CalPERS fee disclosure raises question of whether private equity returns are worth it."
What CalPERS disclosed earlier this week were
"US$24.2 billion in realised net gains to the fund from 1990 to June 30,
2015, based on data from its newly operational Private Equity Accounting and
Reporting Solution (PEARS)." However, "during that same time period,
PEARS data shows that CalPERS' external investment partners have realised $3.4
billion from profit sharing agreements with CalPERS". In fact, some
pension sources quoted in the press expressed surprise that CalPERS' fee
disclosures weren't even higher.
According to Wall Street Journal
calculations, total PE returns of 19.3% for CalPERS over the past 20 years
shrink to 12.3% once 7% in fees is deducted, versus 8.2% for public equity. Yes,
it's still CalPERS' highest-returning asset class. Look at issues below the headline percentages, such as inherent asset class illiquidity
and higher risk levels, and the ratios look even less persuasive. And that's
before we even get anywhere near the issue of why LPs should have to pay that
7% in fees at all. CalPERS' own figures give an even lower total net return for
its PE programme since inception-just 11.1%. With such less-than-stellar
returns, dragged down above all by fee levels, where's the incentive? Or the
justification?
If I were a pension fund -
or a politician or union official in a state like California – I'd be pushing
like crazy to claw back some of that 7%. Or pushing investment committees to
steer clear of the asset class entirely. As the iconic Western pension fund
investor in PE, CalPERS ought to be doing a better job of advocacy, because its
own figures certainly aren't helping, And although there may be no real impetus
in Washington to rein in general partners (GPs), politics at state or local
level, and the political cost of hard-to-justify investment allocation
decisions, may end up doing the job anyway. Some pundits are claiming that the
figures provide fresh ammunition for PE's defenders. I don't think so. If I was
a firm head in a business less insular and self-regarding than the charmed
circle of big buyout GPs, I'd be worried.
2015.12 Asia Asset Management - CalPERS back in the spotlight
By Paul
Mackintosh–Monday November 23, 2015
CalPERs, or the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System, is in the news again - something
that the US$292.18 billion pension giant probably wishes would happen less
often. As of "open book market values at market close on November 17,
2015" – minus one quarter's lag – private equity (PE) constitutes just
over 9.45% of that total value, at $2763 billion. This latest round of
headlines follows the appearance of representatives of its own PE team and
outside advisers before the CalPERS investment committee, during a day-long
informational workshop. In regard to the CalPERS PE programme, The Los Angeles
Times quoted CalPERS investment executive Eric Baggesen as saying that if PE
had been removed from its 2013 portfolio, CalPERS would either have had to deal
with a considerable increase in volatility or reduce its expected return by
0.25%.
Hold on: how much? If that is the kind of difference in returns that the world's seventh largest PE investor would have to digest not to play in the asset class, is it really worth the effort? Not that I'm arguing for CalPERS to retreat from PE, but it ought to give pause to any other more conservative pension fund (for example, in Japan) still wondering whether to resource up and take on investment teams to go into the asset class.
Especially in the light of reported comments from CalPERS programme director Réal Desrochers, and Marte Castanos, senior counsel at the plan. The former warned of "intense competition" to get into top-performing funds; the latter was quoted by Dan Primack in Fortune complaining that general partners (GPs) and their advisers often ride roughshod over confidentiality agreements and attempt to strong-arm limited partners (LPs) into accepting weaker terms based on prior (and confidential) partnerships with other funds, Why does CalPERS sit back and take it? Said competition, which weakens CalPERS' bargaining power against the GPs.
Competition to secure only an additional 0.25% return? From those numbers, this sounds like a somewhat flimsy argument, Not that I believe that tiny amount is the end of the story. But I do suspect that CalPERS, much criticised lately for its investment monitoring, is being a little too passive and defensive. Pension funds investing voters' savings surely have a stronger voice to sway regulators than CalPERS appears prepared to use. And GPs who presume that investors will come, come what may, might care to reflect whether newer institutions, especially Asian, that didn't grow up with the asset class, are going to accept PE's foibles and finagling forever. After all, what kind of argument is 0.25%, set against huge costs, fees, and institutional commitment, to persuade responsible fiduciaries?
Hold on: how much? If that is the kind of difference in returns that the world's seventh largest PE investor would have to digest not to play in the asset class, is it really worth the effort? Not that I'm arguing for CalPERS to retreat from PE, but it ought to give pause to any other more conservative pension fund (for example, in Japan) still wondering whether to resource up and take on investment teams to go into the asset class.
Especially in the light of reported comments from CalPERS programme director Réal Desrochers, and Marte Castanos, senior counsel at the plan. The former warned of "intense competition" to get into top-performing funds; the latter was quoted by Dan Primack in Fortune complaining that general partners (GPs) and their advisers often ride roughshod over confidentiality agreements and attempt to strong-arm limited partners (LPs) into accepting weaker terms based on prior (and confidential) partnerships with other funds, Why does CalPERS sit back and take it? Said competition, which weakens CalPERS' bargaining power against the GPs.
Competition to secure only an additional 0.25% return? From those numbers, this sounds like a somewhat flimsy argument, Not that I believe that tiny amount is the end of the story. But I do suspect that CalPERS, much criticised lately for its investment monitoring, is being a little too passive and defensive. Pension funds investing voters' savings surely have a stronger voice to sway regulators than CalPERS appears prepared to use. And GPs who presume that investors will come, come what may, might care to reflect whether newer institutions, especially Asian, that didn't grow up with the asset class, are going to accept PE's foibles and finagling forever. After all, what kind of argument is 0.25%, set against huge costs, fees, and institutional commitment, to persuade responsible fiduciaries?
2016.01 Vontobel 未來展望
- 雖然不預期發生重大危機,但經濟成長放緩、政治局勢緊張和商品崩跌拖累新興市場而抱持謹慎的態度。儘管貨幣波動程度較 12個月前下降,但貨幣風險仍存在,不過貨幣大幅貶值的狀況較不可能發生,況且貨幣貶值的影響大多已經反應在市場價格上。
- 對巴西減碼,因為政治和總體經濟環境仍有壓力,相關持股仍維持信念,但貨幣波動的影響超過其潛在盈餘成長。
- 中國方面,持續布局電子商務和網路公司,因為長期的市場順風有利於此領域,並體現追尋的關鍵趨勢。不過中國潛在的經濟弱勢趨勢是普遍的。
- 加碼於必要消費產業,儘管發現找尋符合美元計價最低資本報酬條件的新興市場必要消費持股,主要因為貨幣風險和擴張的評價。目前僅有小部分部位在健康護理產業,主要因為缺乏可以投資的公司。
- 在連續兩年表現優於基準指標後,預期優質跨國企業持股將較不具防禦性,並可能無法較以往提供那麼多的下檔保護,特別是當全球市場短期變得較為波動。然而,基於對未來盈餘的預期和這些企業的品質,加上估值下降後,預期長期股價仍將提升。秉持一貫的投資哲學,相信耐心 (非自滿) 是值得嘉許的,儘管短期面臨波動,企業的潛在基本面最終將反應在股價上。
- 總結而言,預期經濟成長放緩和股票市場波動加劇將持續到 2016年,在這樣的市場環境下,選股將是至關重要的,此階段採取聚焦和專注的方法建構投資組合將可在完整的市場循環下打敗大盤。
2015.10 Vontobel 未來展望
- 目前並未看到類似 1997年新興市場危機的情況,主要有兩個重要的因素使本次與之前的危機有所區別:充足的外匯儲備和新興市場國家間浮動利率、匯率機制的優勢。雖然短期風險仍在,但近期新興市場賣壓,對於長期投資人是具吸引力的價值機會。
- 巴西:在精選優質企業中找尋機會,雖然這些企業在疲弱的經濟環境中營運,且弱勢的貨幣使其面臨挑戰,但是在巴西的持股得以在當前的總體經濟環境中展現彈性。巴西目前正進行重要的結構性改革,可望更形強健,並為接下來的經濟成長循環作更多的準備,但短期風險仍高。
- 印度:商品淨進口國相較其他國家受到的影響較少,雖然經濟成長已放緩,繼續在能夠達成 15-17%以上的盈餘成長的耐久性企業中找尋投資機會。
- 中國:預期將看到持續波動,對其保持謹慎的態度已一段時間,且仍維持相對大盤大幅減碼的佈局,主要佈局聚焦於國內消費題材及中國網路公司。由於在其他國家看到較低風險的機會,因此已對這些部位減碼。
- 持續看到必要消費產業的投資機會,特別是無論總體經濟如何變動,消費者都會購買的產品的相關企業。繼續尋找市場龍頭企業,這些企業即使在艱困時期,仍持續花費在像是品牌建立和創新的長期投資上,當成長恢復時,他們的將更具競爭力。
- 近期全球市場急遽的波動使選股變得更為關鍵,有信心尋求具有優異盈餘特性的企業,在完整的經濟景氣循環中具有良好的佈局。
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